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RECENT DECISIONS

435

LABOR LAw-CoNSTITUTIONALITY oF STATUTES PROHIBITING "HoT
Goons" AND "SECONDARY" BoYCOTTs-In a contempt action against the business agent of an A.F.L. furniture a_nd van workers local for violation of an in.
. base d on statutes pro h'b'
.
"h ot goo ds" an d " secon dary" boycotts,1
Junction
1 1tmg
held, petitioner discharged; the statutes are violative of the Fourteenth .f\.mendment of the federal Constitution in prohibiting peaceful picketing or other publication of the facts concerning a labor dispute in pursuance of an "agreement or
combination to cause" any employee to stop handling certain goods or to put
pressureonhisemployertodoso. lnreBlaney, (Cal.1947) 184P. (2d) 892.
The majority declared that the case fell squarely within the doctrines of the
Thornhill 2 and Swing 3 cases, that picketing is free speech and that it need
not be directed against one's own employer to be protected by the Constitution. The majority also rested its opinion in part upon the Wohl 4 case in
which the Supreme Court declared in a situation analogous to the one presented in this case that picketing customers and suppliers of an "unfair"
employer is an exercise of free speech. The concurring opinion stated that
the scope of the statutes was so broad as to include casual word-of-mouth
or published dissemination of the facts concerning a labor dispute if it "directly
or indirectly causes (or) induces" e'mployees of other employers to act in
assistance of the disputing employees through "hot goods" or "secondary" boycott action. The concurring justices chose to assume that picketing for such a
purpose might be prohibited by a properly drawn statute. The lone dissenting
justice, citing the Ritter II case in particular, maintained that the regulation of
picketing by these statutes did not infringe the constitutional guarantee of free
discussion. The dissent apparently failed to distinguish between the picketing
forbidden in the Ritter case (picketing outside the area of the industry in which
the labor dispute takes place) and the picketing supported in the Wohl case
(picketing which follows the product from the supplier to the "unfair" distributor
to the customer). Clearly a prohibition of the latter type of picketing was
here involved, and the doctrine of the Ritter case seems inapplicable. Both
statutes in their entirety were declared invalid by the court as being incapable
of mechanical severance so as to overcome the faults noted. Perhaps the most
interesting feature of this case is that the reasoning of the court seems to apply
equally as well to the language of section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 6 (the Taft-Hartley Act). This section of the new
federal labor statute brands as an unfair labor practice and makes enjoinable
inducement or encouragement of a strike or refusal to handle certain goods
where an object thereof is to force or require an employer to cease doing business with any other person. Both "hot goods" and "secondary" boycotts are
covered by the language of the section and the prohibitions upon inducement
or encouragement of such action seems to cover picketing or other publication
1 Sections 1131-n36 of the California Labor Code as added by Cal. Stats. (1941)
c. 623.
2 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
8 A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1940).
4 Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
5 Carpenters and Joiners Local v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807
(1942).
6 U.S. Pub. L., 80th Cong., 1st sess, c. 120 (1947).
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of the facts of a labor dispute which seeks to bring about such a boycott. The
California court in the instant case, in declaring such inducement or encouragement by picketing to be within the area of free speech, is strictly in line
.with the Supreme Court picketing cases since 1940, and the conclusion seems
inescapable that, barring a repudiation of its previous decisions or a drastic
"reading down" of the terms of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme Court will
declare invalid section 8 (b) (4) (A) when it is called upon to adjudicate the
constitutionality of that section.
Jerry S. McCroskey

